Politics and Monetary Policy
研究政治家与独立央行在利率偏好上的差异，发现政治家普遍偏好更低利率，原因包括对通胀和产出的不同权重、政治经济动机以及关注本国经济而非整个欧元区。
How and why do politicians’ preferences about monetary policy differ from the interest rates set by independent central banks? Looking at the European Central Bank, the paper shows that politicians, on average, favor significantly lower interest rates. Three factors explain the different preferences. First, politicians put relatively less weight on inflation (and more on output) in their preferred monetary policy reaction function. Second, politicians’ preferences are affected by political economy motives. Third, different preferences are also, and largely, due to different constituencies, as politicians primarily focus on national economic objectives rather than the euro area as a whole.