Damaged Goods: Board Decisions to Dismiss Reputationally Compromised Directors
研究为何某些董事会更倾向于解雇与财务欺诈相关的声誉受损董事，基于资源依赖理论，发现董事会对外部资源和支持的正式利益驱动了这些决策。
Prior research shows that directors generally lose some, but not all, of their board seats following their association with financial fraud. This study investigates why some boards are more likely than others to dismiss a reputationally compromised colleague. Using resource dependence theory, we propose that a board's formal interest in securing resources and support from external audiences governs these decisions. We tested our hypotheses using data on the employment fate of directors associated with 63 fraud episodes. The findings contribute to understanding the process of professional devaluation and how resource provision obligations affect boards' governance decisions.