Political Pressures on Monetary Policy During the US Great Inflation
通过分析美联储会议文件，发现1970年代美国通胀上升的重要原因是政治压力导致货币政策收紧延迟、反通胀力度不足，对理解央行独立性与通胀关系有参考价值。
Drawing on an analysis of Federal Open Market Committee (FOMC) documents, this paper argues that political pressures on the Federal Reserve were an important contributor to the rise in inflation in the United States in the 1970s. Members of the FOMC understood that a serious attempt to tackle inflation would generate opposition from Congress and the executive branch. Political considerations contributed to delays in monetary tightening, insufficiently aggressive anti-inflation policies, and the premature abandonment of attempts at disinflation. Empirical analysis verifies that references to the political environment at FOMC meetings are correlated with the stance of monetary policy during this period.