科斯与科斯主义者

Coase Versus the Coasians

Quarterly Journal of Economics · 2001
被引 549
人大 A+FT50ABS 4*

中文导读

比较了法官与监管者执行法律的激励差异,并以1990年代波兰与捷克金融市场监管为例,说明严格监管促进股市发展,而放任监管导致股市萎靡。

Abstract

Who should enforce laws or contracts: judges or regulators? Many Coasians, though not Coase himself, advocate judicial enforcement. We show that the incentives facing judges and regulators crucially shape this choice. We then compare the regulation of financial markets in Poland and the Czech Republic in the 1990s. In Poland, strict enforcement of the securities law by a highly motivated regulator was associated with a rapidly developing stock market. In the Czech Republic, hands-off regulation was associated with a moribund stock market.

科斯定理执法主体司法执行监管激励