Extrinsic Uncertainty and the Informational Role of Prices
研究一个存在有限私人信息状态的金融经济，引入K个外在事件，证明存在非揭示和部分揭示均衡，即均衡价格不传递信号。
We study a financial economy with finitely many states of private information. There are two agents, informed and uninformed. We define agents' expectations on future equilibrium prices as a probability distribution overKdistinct values, i.e., we introduceKextrinsic events. We show that there are open sets of economies with nonrevealing (and also with partially revealing) equilibria: For an appropriate choice of self-fulfilling price expectations, observable equilibrium prices are signal-invariant.Journal of Economic LiteratureClassification Numbers: D52, D82, D84.