A Constant Recontracting Model of Sovereign Debt
构建了一个动态国际借贷模型，分析借款人无法承诺未来还款时，债务国如何通过谈判实现部分违约或重新安排债务，并考虑未来再次谈判的可能性。
We present a dynamic model of international lending in which borrowers cannot commit to future repayments, and where debtors can sometimes successfully negotiate partial defaults, or "rescheduling agreements~. All parties in a debt rescheduling negotiation realize that today's rescheduling agreement may itself have to be ren-egotiated in the future. Our bargaining-theoretic approach allows us to handle the effects ~f uncertainty on sovereign debt contracts in a much more satisfactory way than in earlier analyses. The framework is readily extended to analyze the conflicting interests of different lenders, and of banks and creditor-country taxpayers.