Modes of Interaction Between Divorced Parents
构建了一个模型，将子女抚养费命令的完全遵守等同于子女商品支出上的合作结果，并用威斯康星州行政数据估计，发现加强抚养费执行对离异家庭儿童福利的影响可能较弱。
I develop a model in which exact compliance with child support orders is synonymous with cooperative outcomes with respect to child good expenditures. The child support order imposed by institutional agents serves as focal point for the problem of dividing the gains from cooperation. Compliance is observed when the gains from cooperation exceed the value of noncooperation for both parents. The model is estimated using administrative data from the state of Wisconsin. My estimates imply that increasing child support enforcement activities may have weak effects on the welfare of children of divorced parents.