Continuous Time Repeated Games
构建了一个完全信息连续时间博弈的策略行为模型，将离散时间重复博弈作为特例，并分析了再谈判证明约束下的均衡，应用于古诺双寡头例子。
In this paper, the authors develop a model of strategic behavior in continuous time games of complete information, which includes conventional repeated games in discrete time as a special case. The model developed here admits a very large class of strategies that allows one to extend the repeated game model to continuous time. The set of equilibria in this game may be large--in many cases equal to the feasible individually rational set of payoff s. The authors also study the restriction of renegotiation proofness in this framework and apply these results to a Cournot duopoly example. Copyright 1993 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.