Oligopoly with Asymmetric Information: Differentiation in Credit Markets
研究信贷市场中银行在不对称信息下如何通过水平差异化竞争，发现竞争减弱时银行筛选客户力度下降，但社会福利可能反而提高。
We study an oligopoly model with asymmetric information and product differentiation. The analysis focuses on credit markets. We assume information to be asymmetric with respect to customer characteristics that directly affect bank profits. We analyze the impact of horizontal differentiation, which serves as an index for the degree of competition among banks, on loan-granting practices. We show that with more differentiation (less competition), banks may screen credit applicants less intensively in equilibrium because they compete less aggressively for the most profitable customers. As a result, welfare may actually increase as competition becomes less intense. Total profits may either increase or decrease with the introduction of asymmetric information.