A Dynamic Duopoly Model with Asymmetric Information
研究信息不对称如何影响两期价格竞争双寡头博弈的均衡集合，发现所有均衡都具有合谋特征，且小概率的好类型或坏类型企业会产生不对称影响。
This paper investigates the impact of asymmetric information on the set of equilibria of a two-period duopoly game with price competition. It turns out that all admissible sequential equilibria of this game share a "collusive" character, i.e., ex ante expected profits for a firm of any type are higher than in the complete information case. For small uncertainties, the results are asymmetric: a small probability of a "good" type firm does not make much difference on the set of equilibrium payoffs, but a small probability of a "bad" type firm does. These results survive the introduction of Kohlberg and Martens' (1986) stability concept. Copyright 1990 by Blackwell Publishing Ltd.