TRADEMARK SALES, ENTRY, AND THE VALUE OF REPUTATION*
构建了一个无限期世代交叠的声誉模型，分析商标可交易时，成功企业虽能在出售时获得全部声誉价值，但经营期间声誉溢价降低；考虑折现和进入成本后，商标交易通常减少进入并降低福利，高进入成本时禁止交易可提升福利。
We develop an infinite‐horizon, overlapping‐generations model of reputation in which consumers base willingness to pay for agent services on past performance summarized by a trademark. We show that when trademarks can be sold, successful firms capture the full value of their reputations upon sale but receive smaller premia for good performance while active as service providers. With discounting, all agents are worse off with trademark trade. Taking entry cost into account, we show that trademark trade typically reduces entry. When entry costs are high, welfare is increased by prohibiting such trade.