Exclusive Dealing and the Whiskey Trust, 1890–1895
通过威士忌托拉斯的历史案例，研究排他性交易等纵向限制的竞争效应，发现该托拉斯的排他性策略未能有效阻止竞争对手进入市场，竞争比反垄断诉讼更能约束其行为。
This article uses the history of the Whiskey Trust to explore the competitive effects of vertical restraints such as exclusive dealing. The Whiskey Trust distilled alcoholic spirits and bribed distributors not to carry competing brands of spirits. For the Whiskey Trust, exclusive dealing was an ineffective predatory strategy. Despite the trust's market dominance and manifold predatory strategies, it failed to preempt entry. The trust failed, in part, because its rivals could vertically integrate at low cost. Competition disciplined the trust more effectively than did numerous antitrust suits.