ENVY‐FREENESS AND DISTRIBUTIVE JUSTICE: A REPLY TO KOLM'S COMMENT
回应科尔姆教授关于无嫉妒与公平的争论，解释为何偏好“公平”一词，但质疑其将公平视为平等自由标准的道德解释，并捍卫将公平作为福利主义平等主义标准的观点。
Abstract. This reply takes up specific points raised by Professor Kolm over which there persists some disagreement between us. It offers a rather broad, philosophically oriented discussion of the issues. I explain why I think Kolm is right in preferring the term ‘equity’to that of ‘envy‐freeness,’but I express moral doubts concerning the interpretation proposed by Kolm of equity as a criterion of equal liberty. On this basis, I then defend my own specific interpretation of equity as a welfarist‐egalitarian criterion, and express some reluctance as to the alleged ‘moral irrelevance’of individual preferences in the theory of equity. I also briefly discuss the conceptual role played by counterfactuals and try to mitigate somewhat Kolm's critique of the use of axioms involving ‘imaginary’ situations.