Optimal Tax and Expenditure Policy with Aggregate Uncertainty
研究了在个体生产能力和公共品偏好分布未知时，如何设计最优所得税和公共品提供政策，发现增加公共品提供会导致税收体系更具扭曲性和再分配性。
We study optimal income taxation and public-goods provision under the assumption that the cross-section distributions of productive abilities or public-goods preferences are not known a priori. A conventional Mirrleesian treatment is shown to provoke manipulations of the policy mechanism by individuals with similar interests. The analysis therefore incorporates a requirement of coalition-proofness. The main result is that increased public-goods provision is associated with a more distortionary and a more redistributive tax system. With a conventional Mirrleesian treatment, the level of public-goods provision is not related to how distortionary or redistributive the tax system is.