Financial Signalling and the "Deep-Pocket" Argument
用模型形式化Telser的深口袋论点，分析进入者和在位者的内生财务结构，解释财务脆弱性源于金融市场信息不对称，并说明高价值进入者高杠杆为何激励在位者掠夺性定价。
This article provides a formal representation of Telser's (1966) deep-pocket argument by considering a model in which the entrant's and the incumbent's financial structures are endogenous. The entrant's financial vulnerability may be explained by informational asymmetries in financial markets. Financiers are uncertain of the entrant's true value, but they know the incumbent's true worth. Both firms have to finance a fixed expenditure before starting production. In equilibrium the incumbent finances with equity, while the high-value entrant comes into the market heavily leveraged compared with the incumbent. This provides an incentive for the incumbent to engage in predatory practices such as a price war to exhaust the entrant financially and cause his bankruptcy.