Alternative Tests of Agency Theories of Callable Corporate Bonds
通过分析1987-1991年工业债券样本，从评级变化、首次赎回日分布、发行人投资活动和期权价值等角度检验三种代理理论，发现这些理论无法充分解释可赎回债券的普遍性。
According to agency theories, the prevalence of callable bonds arises from asymmetric information, a risk incentive or asset substitution problem, or an under investment problem. These theories are difficult to distinguish empirically because there are no direct measures of agency costs. Previous studies have found support for agency theories as a group, focusing on whether a bond has a call provision. We examine several areas in which the various theories are distinguishable: the subsequent rating changes of the bonds, the distribution of first call dates, the investment activity of bond issuers, and the value of the call options. We also examine trends in the use of call options over time. Based on a sample of industrial bonds issued between 1987 and 1991, our alternative tests provide evidence against the three agency theories. We conclude that agency theory, while potentially important for some firms, is unlikely to be the most important explanation of callable corporate bonds.