Vertical Control and Price Versus Nonprice Competition
研究制造商通过零售商分销产品时，零售商在价格和服务上的竞争如何影响集体利润最大化，并指出纵向约束可以纠正零售商因关注错误消费者群体而偏向价格竞争的扭曲。
This paper considers a manufacturer distributing a product through retailers who compete in price and service, which reduces the time it takes to purchase a good. The mix of these instruments that maximizes collective profit is determined by the tastes of consumers on the "product margin, " whereas decentralized retailers consider as well the tastes of consumers on the interretailer margins. Given search or travel costs, consumers with low time costs are overrepresented on the interretailer margins. In considering customers on the wrong margin, retailers are therefore biased toward price competition. This distortion that can be corrected with vertical restraints.