A Model of Nominal Contracts
构建了一个模型，其中预先规定名义工资的劳动合同是内生的，作为自我选择机制，高生产率工人通过接受名义合同来传递信号，无需货币在特定交易中使用。
A model is produced in which labor contracts that prespecify (unindexed) nominal wage payments arise endogenously. These contracts function as a self-selection mechanism. Under appropriately different attitudes toward price-level risk (which can either arise directly from preferences or be induced by different patterns of asset holdings), nominal contracts allow high-productivity workers to signal their type by their willingness to accept unindexed contracts. This explanation of nominal contracts does not require that money be used in any particular set of transactions, and nominal contracts enhance the risk faced by all parties accepting them. Copyright 1989 by University of Chicago Press.