Direct and Indirect Sale of Information
比较了垄断者向金融市场交易者销售信息的两种方式：直接销售（买家观察信号）和间接销售（卖家出售基于私人信息的投资组合份额），发现最优方式取决于均衡价格揭示的信息量。
The authors compare two methods for a monopolist to sell information to traders in a financial market. In a direct sale, information buyers observe versions of the seller's signal while in an indirect sale the seller sells shares in a portfolio based on his private information. It is shown that, when traders are identical and pricing is linear, there is a trade-off between optimal surplus extraction that is possible under direct sale and more effective control of the usage of information that is possible under indirect sale. The optimal selling method depends on how much information is revealed by equilibrium prices. Copyright 1990 by The Econometric Society.