The effects of externalities and framing on bribery in a petty corruption experiment
通过一个模拟小腐败交易的一次性博弈实验，发现当贿赂对第三方造成的损失较大且实验被描述为腐败场景时，贿赂提议减少；但框架效应对贿赂接受无影响。
Abstract Using a simple one-shot bribery game simulating petty corruption exchanges, we find evidence of a negative externality effect and a framing effect. When the losses suffered by third parties due to a bribe being offered and accepted are high and the game is presented as a petty corruption scenario instead of in abstract terms bribes are less likely to be offered. Higher negative externalities are also associated with less bribe acceptance. However, framing has no effect on bribe acceptance, indicating that the issue of artificiality may be of particular importance in bribery experiments.