A Theory of Optimal Agenda Design
形式化了在有限备选方案上设计最优投票议程的问题，假设选民是“天真的”（不策略投票），通过动态规划求解议程，以最大化特定方案的概率或议程设置者的期望效用。
This paper formalizes the problem of designing optimal agendas for voting over finite alternative spaces, when voters are assumed to be “naive,” (i.e., they do not vote strategically). The class of agendas considered here is quite broad, and includes, as special cases, such methods as pairwise voting, sequential and elimination procedures, partitioning schemes, and all binary procedures. Given individual preferences over the basic alternative space, and various assumptions about how individuals choose between subsets of alternatives, one can then formalize the problem of designing agendas as a dynamic programming problem and solve for optimal agendas, i.e., agendas having either the highest probability of leading to a given alternative or having the highest expected utility to the agenda setter. Illustrations are given showing how the methods can be applied in specific examples.