Coase Theorem and the Taiwan Strait Conflict
指出科斯定理在解决争端时隐含存在一个凌驾性权威（如法院）的假设，当该权威缺失时需另寻逻辑使单一所有者机制生效，并将此见解应用于台湾海峡冲突，提出“一个中国，两个共和国”政策。
SUMMARY The idea of a single‐owner who owns the opposing interests of a dispute has been suggested in the literature to make the Coase Theorem operational in resolving dispute. This paper points out that the idea implicitly assumes the existence of an overriding authority, e.g., the Courts, to implement the solution. When such an overriding authority does not exist, a different rationale must be employed to make the single‐owner apparatus work. This insight is explored and then applied to help resolve the Taiwan Strait Conflict. Specifically, a ‘One China, Two Republics’ policy is proposed and its implications illustrated.