Transient Institutional Ownership and CEO Contracting
研究发现，当公司有较多短暂机构投资者时，CEO现金奖金中盈利权重降低、年回报权重升高，且股权授予可能性和规模增加，表明合同设计会考虑短暂投资者带来的隐性激励。
ABSTRACT: Prior research documents that CEOs respond to transient ownership preferences by choosing actions to meet short-term earnings targets. This study examines whether contract designers anticipate these actions and respond by adjusting explicit CEO compensation contracts. We find that, in determining CEO cash bonuses, firms with high levels of transient investors, on average, place a relatively low weight on earnings and a relatively high weight on annual returns. Additionally, both the likelihood of granting equity and the magnitude of annual equity grants to CEOs are higher with a higher level of transient investors, after controlling for previously studied determinants of equity grants. The results suggest transient-owner trading behavior creates implicit incentives for CEOs to take actions that increase current earnings, and firms take these implicit incentives into account in the design of explicit CEO compensation contracts.