Most-Favored-Customer Protection versus Price Discrimination over Time
研究卖方如何为无残值产能定价，比较跨期价格歧视与最惠顾客保护两种策略，发现产能大时倾向后者，顾客对首期过剩需求不确定时倾向前者。
How should a seller price capacity that has no salvage value to heterogeneous customers whose valuations are private information? There are two periods, and the seller cannot precommit to prices in the later period. One option is price discrimination: first price high, then discount later if excess capacity remains. By offering most-favored-customer protection, the seller can charge more in advance, but will leave capacity unsold with positive probability. The author favors the most-favored-customer protection when capacity is large and leans toward price discrimination when customers are more uncertain about the degree of excess demand in the first period. Copyright 1991 by University of Chicago Press.