The Impact of Board Composition and Top Management Team Ownership Structure on Post-IPO Performance in Young Entrepreneurial Firms
挑战代理理论，发现年轻企业IPO后董事会应由原高层管理团队主导，而非独立外部董事，外部董事应提供资源而非监督。
Challenging agency theory prescriptions for board composition, we contend that the boards of young firms that have recently gone public are best comprised of a majority of original top management team (TMT) members, rather than independent outsiders. We argue that such board members possess valuable tacit knowledge of the firms and their entrepreneurial visions and are in the best position to provide oversight. We additionally argue that outsiders should provide resources that firms' TMTs might use to execute their strategies, rather than monitor the TMTs. Our results from 1996-97 data on 524 initial public offerings support our contentions.