The Welfare Effects of Tax Competition Reconsidered: Politicians and Political Institutions
从比较政治学视角分析税收竞争的福利效应，发现总统制国会民主制下税收竞争通常改善福利，而议会民主制下若公共品价值足够高则有害；结果取决于政治家动机（连任或寻租）和耐心程度。
The views on the welfare effects of tax competition differ widely. Some see the fiscal externalities as the cause for underprovision of public goods, while others see tax competition as the means of reducing government inefficiencies. Using a comparative politics approach we show that tax competition among presidential-congressional democracies is typically welfare improving, while harmful among parliamentary democracies if under the latter public goods are sufficiently valued. The results hold when politicians seek re-election because of exogenous benefits of holding office. By contrast, when politicians hold office only to extract rents, tax competition is harmful if politicians are sufficiently patient. Copyright © The Author(s). Journal compilation © Royal Economic Society 2009.