Efficient Auction Mechanisms for Supply Chain Procurement
研究供应链采购中的多单位Vickrey拍卖，首次将运输成本纳入复杂供应网络的拍卖中，提出同时考虑生产和运输决策的机制以最小化总成本，并引入保留价格函数以控制买方支付。
We consider multiunit Vickrey auctions for procurement in supply chain settings. This is the first paper that incorporates transportation costs into auctions in a complex supply network. We first introduce an auction mechanism that makes simultaneous production and transportation decisions so that the total supply chain cost is minimized and induces truth telling from the suppliers. Numerical study shows that considerable supply chain cost savings can be achieved if production and transportation costs are considered simultaneously. However, the buyer's payments in such auctions can be high. We then develop a new Vickrey-type auction that incorporates the buyer's reservation price function into quantity allocation and payment decision. As a result, the buyer has some control over his payments at the expense of introducing uncertainty in the quantity acquired in the auction.