无成本信息下的监管:增量剩余补贴方案

Regulating without Cost Information: The Incremental Surplus Subsidy Scheme

International Economic Review · 1988
被引 137 · 同刊同年前 9%
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

提出一种增量剩余补贴方案,即使监管者不了解垄断企业的成本结构,也能通过共享需求信息和观察支出,促使企业按边际成本定价、最小化生产成本并进行有效投资,同时大幅限制其经济租金。

Abstract

The authors propose a regulatory mechanism, called the incremental surplus subsidy (ISS) scheme, that can be implemented even when the regulato r has no knowledge of the monopolist's cost structure. The regulator need only share the firm's knowledge of demand (which may be imperfec t) and be able to observe (with a lag) the firm's expenditures. The I SS scheme induces the firm to set marginal cost prices, to minimize p roduction costs, and to undertake efficient investment levels. It als o severely limits the firm's rents, and eliminates them altogether if the firm's discount rate is known. Copyright 1988 by Economics Department of the University of Pennsylvania and the Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association.

增量剩余补贴方案监管机制成本信息缺失垄断企业