Vertical restraints and horizontal control
研究主导制造商如何通过纵向约束获取对竞争性零售商品的横向控制，解释货位费、亏本销售等零售实践，适用于超市和便利店场景。
This article considers vertical restraints in a setting in which duopoly retailers each sell more than one manufactured good. Vertical restraints by a dominant manufacturer enable the firm to acquire horizontal control over a competitively supplied retail good. The equilibrium contracts produce symptoms that are consistent with a variety of observed retail practices, including slotting fees paid to retailers by competitive suppliers, loss leadership, and predatory accommodation with below‐cost manufacturer pricing for the dominant brand(s). Applications are developed for supermarket retailing, where the manufacturer of a national brand seeks to control the retail pricing of a supermarket's private label, and for convenience stores, where a gasoline provider seeks to control the retail pricing of an in‐store composite consumption good .