MANAGERIAL INCENTIVES AND THE PRICE EFFECTS OF MERGERS*
放松了管理者是股东完美代理人的假设，研究多产品公司中管理者为提高产品质量付出不可观测努力时，如何平衡激励与价格协调，发现内部价格竞争可能降低质量调整后的价格，对反垄断政策有重要启示。
Most analysis of market power assumes that managers are perfect agents for shareholders. This paper relaxes that assumption. When managers of a multi-product firm exert unobservable effort to improve product quality, there is a trade-off between providing adequate effort incentives and ensuring sufficient price-coordination between the product divisions. This makes some intra-firm price competition optimal, explaining why many multi-product firms allow for competition between divisions. When there are effort spillovers, the optimal amount of price competition can be as great as when the products are under separate ownership. Even with some profit-sharing, intra-firm price competition can reduce quality-adjusted price, which has important implications for antitrust policy.