Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions
通过分析州公路建设合同拍卖中的投标数据，利用合谋者有限参与的特征，检测是否存在串通投标行为，发现合谋者提交虚假高价投标，其排名分布与成本无关。
This paper examines bidding in auctions for state highway construction contracts, in order to determine whether bid rigging occurred. Detection of collusion is possible because of limited participation in the collusive scheme. Collusion did not take the form of a bid rotation scheme. Instead, several ring members bid on most jobs. One was a serious bidder, and the other submitted phony higher bids. The bids of noncartel firms, as well as their rank distribution, were related to cost measures. In contrast, the rank distribution of higher cartel bids was unrelated to similar cost measures and differed from that of the low cartel bid. Copyright 1993 by University of Chicago Press.