Vertical Control of Price and Inventory
研究上游制造商如何通过合同设计（如转售价格下限或回购政策）协调下游两个差异化竞争零售商的定价与库存决策，以应对需求不确定和缺货时的需求溢出问题。
This paper offers a simple approach to the theory of decentralizing inventory and pricing decisions along a supply chain. We consider an upstream manufacturer selling to two outlets, which compete as differentiated duopolists and face uncertain demand. Demand spillovers between the outlets arise in the event of stockouts. The price mechanism, in which each outlet pays a two-part price and chooses price and inventory, virtually never coordinates incentives efficiently. Contracts that can elicit first-best decisions include resale price floors or buy-back policies (retailer-held options to sell inventory back to the manufacturers).