The Learning Curve, Predation, Antitrust, and Welfare
将掠夺行为的经济学定义应用于具有学习曲线的双寡头动态竞争模型，发现理性掠夺在均衡中存在，且低于成本的定价既非必要也非充分条件；反垄断分析表明，禁止掠夺可能有益或损害消费者福利，取决于市场结构细节。
An economic definition of predation is applied to a dynamic model of duopoly competition with learning curves. It is shown that rational predation occurs in equilibrium, although below‐cost pricing is neither a necessary nor a sufficient indicator of predation. A conceptual framework for antitrust analysis of predation shows that a prohibition of predation might help or harm consumer welfare depending on details of market structure, although the informational requirements of fashioning an effective legal rule against harmful predation are formidable.