Self-Enforcing Wage Contracts
研究风险中性企业与风险厌恶工人之间的长期工资合同，双方均可无成本违约并在随机现货市场买卖劳动。最优自我执行合同下工资具有粘性，其变动规则是围绕每个现货工资存在一个时不变区间，合同工资每期调整至落入该区间所需的最小幅度。
We examine long-term wage contracts between a risk-neutral firm and a risk-averse worker when both can costlessly renege and buy or sell labour at a random spot market wage. A self-enforcing contract is one in which neither party ever has an incentive to renege. In the optimum self-enforcing contract, wages are sticky: they are less variable than spot market wages and positively serially correlated. They are updated by a simple rule: around each spot wage is a time invariant interval, and the contract wage changes each period by the smallest amount necessary to bring it into the current interval.