Evasion of Incomes Policy: A Model of Non-Compliance
利用未公开的新收入调查数据，研究1973-1974年英国收入政策下谈判群体的规避行为，发现补充谈判和低薪工人比例显著影响违规程度。
This paper uses unpublished New Earnings Survey data to examine the extent to which bargaining groups evaded the incomes policy which ran from April 1973 to April 1974. It finds considerable evidence to support an economic model of noncompliance. Breaches were significantly larger where supplementary bargaining occurred or where there was a large proportion of low-paid workers. Evidently, the policy was less stringently enforced toward the end of the period, but traditional packaging devices appeared to be of little importance to overall evasion. Copyright 1989 by Royal Economic Society.