Intertemporal Price Discrimination in Frictionless Durable Goods Monopolies
研究了耐用品垄断者如何通过同时销售和出租耐用品来实现跨期价格歧视，并发现这会导致销售延迟和有限交易期，但市场长期有效。
I show that small differences in quality and production costs between durables and non‐durables in a product line allow a durable goods monopolist to intertemporally price discriminate even with continuous trading. In particular, a monopolist would want to both sell and rent out a durable to achieve price discrimination. This incentive to price discriminate simultaneously creates inefficient delay in the sale of the durable good, a finite trading period and long run efficiency of the market. The Coase conjecture fails because the non‐durable good acts as an outside option that guarantees a minimum profit in the market for durables.