Entry, Fixed Costs and the Aggregation of Private Information
研究市场规模不确定且进入者需承担固定成本时，价格系统加总私人信息的能力。发现即使私人信息总量极大，均衡仍是随机的，且极限均衡不趋近于完全信息瓦尔拉斯结果，揭示了导致信息损失的技术因素（规模递增）。
We investigate the ability of the price system to aggregate private information in a market of uncertain size and where set-up costs are incurred by entrants. It is shown that the equilibrium is random even when the totality of private information is so large that aggregate uncertainty is virtually non-existent. In particular, the limiting equilibrium does not approach the full-information, Walrasian outcome. Hence, the model identifies a technological factor (increasing returns) which gives rise to informational losses.