The Generalized Theory of Transfers and Welfare: Exogenous (Policy-Imposed) and Endogenous (Transfer-Induced) Distortions
在存在外生和内生扭曲的两商品世界中重新审视转移支付的福利效应，发现特定条件下转移可能使捐赠国变富、受援国变穷，对政策制定者有参考价值。
This paper reconsiders the welfare effects of a transfer payment in a two-commodity world with two agents (countries), by taking the presence of exogenous and endogenous distortions into account. When there is an exogenous tax-cumsubsidy on production, consumption, or trade, the analysis demonstrates that a transfer may paradoxically enrich the donor and immiserize the recipient under certain specific conditions. These welfare paradoxes are also shown to be possible if the transfer endogenously induces "directly unproductive profit-seeking" activity of lobbyists. Concluding remarks emphasize the paper's relevance for policymakers.