Caveat Venditor: Trust Asymmetries in Acquisitions of Entrepreneurial Firms
研究了创业企业收购中买卖双方对对方可信度的不对称看法，发现这些不对称如何导致欺骗和防范行为，且双方对对方可信度的判断常出错，基于信任选择买家反而增加创业者脆弱性。
I explore the role of trust in acquisitions of entrepreneurial firms, taking a dyadic view that gives equal attention to buyers and sellers. The two parties have asymmetric views regarding whether their counterparts are trustworthy. I outline how these asymmetries emerge, persist, and influence behavior, including tendencies to behave deceptively and to guard against deception. I also find that buyers' and sellers' beliefs concerning whether their counterparts are trustworthy and trusting are often erroneous. I explore the implications of these findings for developing a theory of trust asymmetries and argue that selecting buyers on the basis of trust increases rather than diminishes entrepreneurs' vulnerability.