Small Enterprise: Finance, Ownership and Control
利用代理理论、信息不对称和交易成本经济学，分析了小企业在资本结构、融资缺口、管理层收购和特许经营中的优势与劣势，解释了其持续存在的原因。
Finance, ownership and control issues have received a great deal of attention in recent years as centres of interest in the ‘new institutional economics’. Much of the debate has been fuelled by the inability of neoclassical economics to explain the continued existence, and increasing importance, of small enterprises. Developments in agency theory, information asymmetry and signalling theory, and transaction cost economics are identified as contributing to a new approach. The concepts distilled from a review of these developments are then used in the analyses of well‐known phenomena involving small enterprises. These include capital structure and access to capital markets featuring the finance gap, the underpricing of new issues and the small firm effect. In addition, going private, by means of management buy‐outs, and franchising are examined. It is seen that the economic literature on finance, ownership and control helps to explain both the advantages and disadvantages of small enterprises. Their continued existence is seen as being due to a trade‐off of various costs and benefits.