Sequential Investments and Options to Own
研究合资企业中常见的或有所有权结构，通过一个双方序列投资产生联合剩余的敲竹杠问题，证明一方初始拥有企业、另一方有按约定价格购买的选择权可实现最优投资，且该结果在再谈判和不确定性下依然成立。
Contingent ownership structures are p r evalent in joint ventures.This paper o ers an explanation based on the investment incentives provided by such an arrangement.We consider a hold-up problem in which two parties make relationshipspeci c investments sequentially in order to generate a joint surplus in the future.In our model, the following ownership structure implements rst best investments: one party owns the rm initially, while the other party has the option to buy the rm at a set price a t a later date.This result is robust to the possibility of renegotiation and uncertainty.