U.S. Trade Threats: Rhetoric or War?
用历史数据估计两个probit方程，分析美国301条款下哪些经济和政治因素会加剧贸易摩擦或促成协议，对研究贸易政策与国际关系的学者有参考价值。
Abstract We present an empirical analysis of factors determining trade wars and agreements under U.S. trade law Section 301. A system of two probit equations is estimated using historical data on Section 301 cases to determine which economic and political factors increase the likelihood of trade frictions. The likelihood of trade war increases when the United States's export share in the world market declines, when the United States is less dependent on the market of the targeted country, when foreign policy makers are in an election year, and when negotiations relate to highly protected and unionized industries in the targeted country.