Agency, Bid Resistance and the Market for Corporate Control
研究英国收购案例中目标公司管理层在收购后采取的防御措施，发现这些措施既降低了收购成功率以保护管理层利益，又为股东带来9%至14%的财富增长，表明抵制收购对管理层和股东均有益。
In this paper we investigate the effects of post‐bid defence activity for a sample of takeover bids in the UK. We find that most of the defences investigated promote the interests of target managers by significantly lowering the probability of bid success. We also find that most of the defences promote the interests of shareholders by increasing wealth gains by an amount that varies between 9% and 14%. These results suggest that bid resistance is to the mutual benefit of the managers and shareholders of target firms. This conclusion is in line with recent developments in agency theory.