Equalizing Discrimination and Cartel Pricing in Transport Rate Regulation
利用货运单据数据，发现公路运输管制主要维持了卡车司机的卡特尔，而铁路管制则通过平等化歧视削弱了铁路卡特尔；公路费率对成本和议价能力反应理性，铁路费率则相反，因此放松管制对两行业影响不同。
There are two possible outcomes of transport regulation: (1) maintaining a carrier cartel and (2) imposing equalizing discrimination against advantaged and in favor of disadvantaged shippers. Both functions have required a complex rate structure to enforce the respective forms of price discrimination. Using a sample of freight bills from motor carriers and railroads, this paper demonstrates that the principal result of motor carrier regulation has been to maintain a cartel of truckers, while railroad regulation has thwarted the wishes of the railroad cartel by imposing equalizing discrimination on weak and strong shippers. Motor carrier rates respond in an economically rational manner to costs and shipper bargaining power; rail rates are either unresponsive or perversely responsive to the same factors. Deregulation should have divergent effects in the two industries.