双重劳动力市场中的雇佣关系(“能找到这工作真不错”)

Employment Relations in Dual Labor Markets ("It's Nice Work If You Can Get It")

Journal of Labor Economics · 1990
被引 79
人大 AABS 4

中文导读

检验了四种理论来解释大企业为何支付更高工资,包括固定雇佣成本、监控成本、效率工资和团队生产,揭示了美国劳动力市场中工资和工作条件的异质性。

Abstract

Jobs in big firms command higher wages. I examine four theories that could explain this relation. First, large firms incur higher fixed employment costs including more specific training. Second, monitoring costs are greater in big firms and can be spread by hiring more productive workers. Third, large firms may choose to pay efficiency wages to deter shirking. Finally, large employers organize production around teams and pay higher wages to get workers who comply with the discipline of team production. The dispersion of wages and working conditions in the U.S. labor market reflect the heterogeneity of jobs (employment relations) and individuals.

大型企业工资溢价效率工资团队生产劳动力市场分割