Has Moral Hazard Become a More Important Factor in Managerial Compensation?
利用跨越60年的企业和管理层薪酬数据，估计了一个道德风险的主-代理模型，发现企业规模的外生增长是薪酬增长和波动的主要驱动力，并通过加剧利益冲突和经理人市场分化两个渠道发挥作用。
We estimate a principal-agent model of moral hazard with longitudinal data on firms and managerial compensation over two disjoint periods spanning 60 years to investigate increased value and variability in managerial compensation. We find exogenous growth in firm size largely explains these secular trends in compensation. In our framework, exogenous firm size works through two channels. First, conflicts of interest between shareholders and managers are magnified in large firms, so optimal compensation plans are now more closely linked to insider wealth. Second, the market for managers has become more differentiated, increasing the premium paid to managers of large versus small firms.