On existence of ex post Nash consistent representation for effectivity functions
研究了有限玩家和备选方案下的效力函数，在玩家对他人偏好具有不完全信息（私人价值）的假设下，刻画了哪些效力函数存在事后纳什一致表示，即存在一个博弈形式使得权力分配与效力函数相同且对任何偏好剖面都有事后纳什均衡。
We consider effectivity functions for finitely many players and alternatives. We assume that players have incomplete information—with private values—about the preferences of the other players. Our main result is the characterization of effectivity functions which have an ex post Nash consistent representation, i.e., there is a game form such that (i) the distribution of power among coalitions of players is the same as in the effectivity function and (ii) there is an ex post Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies) for any preference profile.