Veto Threats: Rhetoric in a Bargaining Game
研究立法过程中发言、提案和否决的博弈模型，分析不完全信息下选择者通过修辞传递类型信息如何影响提案结果，发现只有折中提案会被否决。
A specific bargaining game is studied, motivated by the speech-making, billproposing, and bill-vetoing observed in legislative processes. The game has two players, a chooser and a proposer, with the preferences of the chooser not known to the proposer. The chooser starts the game by talking. Then the proposer proposes an outcome, which the chooser accepts or vetoes. Only two kinds of perfect equilibria exist. In the more interesting kind the chooser tells the proposer which of two sets contains his type. Two proposals are possibly elicited, a compromise proposal and the proposer's favorite proposal. Ironically, only the compromise proposal is ever vetoed.