商业周期中的合谋定价

Collusion over the Business Cycle

RAND Journal of Economics · 1995
被引 11
人大 AFT50ABS 4

中文导读

提出一个理论,分析市场在商业周期波动中的合谋定价行为,发现合谋价格可能随需求增长率的时序相关性而呈现顺周期或逆周期,且合谋定价周期的幅度受繁荣和衰退阶段预期时长的影响。

Abstract

We present a theory of collusive pricing in markets subject to business cycle fluctuations. In the business cycle model that we adopt, market demand alternates stochastically between fast-growth (boom) and slow-growth (recession) phases. We provide a complete characterization of the most-collusive prices and show that: (1). the most-collusive prices may be procyclical (countercyclical) when demand growth rates are postively (negatively) correlated through time, and (2). the amplitude of the collusive pricing cycle is larger when the expected duration of boom phases decreases and when the expected duration of recession phases increases. We also offer a generalization of Rotemberg and Saloner's (1986) model, and interpret their findings in terms of transitory demand shocks that occur within broader business cycle phases.

合谋定价商业周期需求增长反周期定价