Monitoring as a Motivation for IPO Underpricing
检验了监督考虑是否促使经理人压低IPO价格，基于美国IPO样本发现初始回报、机构持股和收购可能性的决定因素与监督论点不一致，因此监督并非IPO抑价的重要决定因素。
ABSTRACT Brennan and Franks (1997) and Stoughton and Zechner (1998) provide contrasting arguments for why monitoring considerations create incentives for managers to underprice their firms' IPOs (initial public offerings). Like Smart and Zutter (2003) , we examine these arguments using a sample of U.S. IPOs. However, we find evidence that the determinants of initial returns, institutional shareholdings, and post‐IPO likelihood of acquisition are not consistent with these arguments. Thus, we conclude that monitoring considerations are not important determinants of IPO underpricing.